Deep packet inspection meets Net neutrality, CALEA

In one of the earliest and most referenced popular articles on deep packet inspection, Anderson reports on the technical capacities, uses, and potential implications associated with networking technology. Carriers examine the payload, or content layer, of data packets that pass through ISPs’ networks to determine what applications are transmitting and receiving data. Using application signatures (telltale identifiers based on the unique characteristics of applications’ transmissions) particular traffic can be delayed, recorded, modified, or prioritized. Further, DPI permits more granular provision of Internet service; bandwidth caps can be diligently enforced and overage charges generated when partnering DPI equipment with account billing services, and particular services (e.g. online gaming) can be offered on a per-customer basis. DPI vendors maintain that service limitations can lower costs for end-users and that throttling (delaying) some application traffic produces a fairer network because it prevents any application from consuming more than its “fair share” of bandwidth.

Anderson recognizes that, if the last-mile market of Internet service is competitive, DPI might operate as an economic differentiator. He worries, however, that DPI equipment could be inserted into backbone providers’ networks and subsequently let them exert undue control over the data coursing across the Internet as a whole. Finally, DPI is often sold as being “CALEA Compliant,” indicating that it conforms with US government surveillance laws. That many of these devices are sold internationally suggests that many of the routing devices deployed outside the US may conform to American, rather than local, Internet intercept and access policies.

Bibliographic information:

Anderson, Nate (2007). Deep packet inspection meets Net neutrality, CALEA. Ars Technica. Retrieved September 10, 2010 from http://arstechnica.com/hardware/news/2007/07/Deep-packet-inspection-meets-net-neutrality.ars

If you’re interested in downloading Christopher Parsons’ full annotated bibliography about deep packet inspection, click here.

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About Christopher Parsons

Christopher is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is currently attending to a particular set of technologies that facilitate digitally mediated surveillance, including Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), behavioral advertising, and mobile devices. He thinks through how these technologies influence citizens in their decision to openly express themselves or engage in self-censoring behavior on a regular basis. He blogs at Technology, Thoughts, and Trinkets and is @caparsons on Twitter.
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